Cuba after the July 11 protests

 ..from another contributor.

The Generation Gap

Abstract: For years there has been talk and warnings about stark generational differences in Cuba. Now the polls and social unrest signal a clear fracture between the old and the young. This may bring hope to some, but the lack of democratic values, imbalanced culture and increased radicalization of Cubans are a bad omen for the future. This essay focuses on the gap between generations, and ideas, and why this isn’t particularly helpful to build a democratic consensus in Cuba.

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A Tale of Rupture vs. Continuity

The conceptualization of generations in Cuba can be as much political as academic. Different schools of thought prioritize generational continuity while others focus on the rupture factor.[1] This resembles the government propaganda in the island and its insistence on political continuance opposite to radical change[2]. For the purposes of this article, we’ll address to what extent younger generations are avoiding continuity and embracing rupture in a new Cuban Zeitgeist.

For decades the symbology of the revolution has been mostly focused on the rebels that overthrew dictator Fulgencio Batista, and especially on the figure of Fidel Castro. This failed to transmit a sense of political belonging to newer generations, often subject to the whims of their predecessors. It took 60 years for a new generation to assume power on the island, and yet it happened through previously well-established professional ties and within limits. Praising the "historical generation" of the revolution is a necessary ritual for young and old people with political aspirations in the state. The social and institutional dynamics that prevent change in Cuba are rooted so deep that a real transformation requires more than presidential political will, but the empowering of reformers in the government.

Young advocates for economic and political reform (even with left-leaning inclinations) struggle to ascend the bureaucratic ladder and often are ostracized from any position of power. Natural leadership is perceived as problematic and disincentivized. In the past, universities have received orders to identify “negative leaders” and track their behavior. The Communist Party (PCC) controls the budget and leadership of the Communist Youth (UJC) and they control the Federation of University Students. These are the only legal organizations for the young in Cuba. The protests of July 11th found large portions of the youth disengaged from these institutions, which today lack credibility and real operability.

Given the government's reluctance in the past to extend the Internet, the COVID-19 social distancing measures caught the island in the worst position for political stability. Enough connectivity to access a highly politicized social media environment but not sufficient to study or work from home at a massive scale. For many, social media is their only contact with reality, and political activism the only control they have right now on their future. New leaderships are being shaped online, far more effective than their counterparts in the institutions.

The desire for change starts at home; the youth only need to see the poor fate of their parents and grandparents to pursue some kind of change. Despite a series of promises and periods of hope, the government's reluctance to reform the economy and domestic politics only aggravates distrust in the future. In this scenario, the president’s support for continuity was not only a mistake but made July 11th inevitable.

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Cuban Vulnerabilities

The Trumpification of US policy towards Cuba and its cruel effect on everyday life had a generational impact on the island. Previous optimism and hope were replaced by pessimistic inertia and increasing efforts to migrate by younger generations. COVID-19 also took away their hope for the future. On July 11th we saw a glimpse of the dissatisfaction and desperation of many. Such a vulnerable situation doesn't come without perils.

With increased access to the Internet, many young Cubans, mostly from urban areas, are shaping their political ideas based on foreign information provided by friends and family abroad. This influence mostly comes from cities like Miami and Madrid, epicenters of conservative policies in the United States and Europe. Such interactions create a perception among young Cubans that Florida-style democracy is the paradigm of American politics or that the People’s Party in Spain represents the European model for political and economic development. Social democratic ideas from Nordic countries or the movement for democratic socialism in the United States are rejected by Cuban authorities and mostly ignored by newer generations with a desire to fit global political trends.

Still amazed with having access to social media, Cubans have little recognition of the hazards of political interaction online. This is not unique to Cuba. In many countries, we can see how echo chambers and alternate realities on the Internet support preconceived ideas and further radicalize groups with different political inclinations and age. The Cuban government has focused on controlling access and speech on the Internet, first by cutting off social media when deemed necessary and second with Decree-Law 35 that prohibits the dissemination of false news and incitement to violence. Anything can be considered false or inciting by the authorities under Cuba’s fragile rule of law.

Since the Cuban government depended on Fidel Castro’s charismatic leadership for decades, the science of political communication is often disregarded as a bourgeoisie entrapment. While older generations maintain overall loyalty to the party, new communist leaders are not particularly captivating to the young and cannot compete against dissidents with international experience. Pandering to the Cuban people while reinforcing their pre-existing beliefs is common practice nowadays on both sides. This battle for hearts and minds has a target audience inexperienced in the tricks of populism and ripe for demagogy. The digital arena provides little incentive for critical thinking or nuances.

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Young intellectuals, journalists, and activists, are aware that the use of economic pressure to achieve political goals is not a legitimate practice in the eyes of international law, but they still avoid denouncing it (or at least denounce it less often than domestic issues) to avoid siding with the Communist Party. Over time, the Cuban government's abuse of the embargo to explain domestic hardships provoked a rejection and underestimation of the effect of sanctions. Now that the US continues its focus on provoking maximum hardships among Cubans, mentioning the embargo is like one of Aesop's Fables: the government has cried wolf too often. The protesters of July 11th probably didn't see much US responsibility for their misfortune.

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There is little interest in either the US or Cuban governments for doing the hard work of cultivating democratic values and moderation to pursue a national consensus in Cuba. While most actors remain focused on politics, others take advantage of a vulnerable moment. Every day evangelical churches expand in Cuba and their socially conservative agenda targets every generation. We have seen before what happens when communist rule starts to collapse; religion fills the ideological vacuum as it did in post-Soviet countries. The US taxpayer is already helping fund these activities, in the last decade Evangelical Christian Humanitarian Outreach for Cuba has received millions of dollars from USAID for projects that combine religion with political activism.

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One last factor that contributes to social unrest is the behavior of the Cuban government. With a population thirsty for change, any decent politician would embark on a program of reforms to increase support. The Communist Party has promised those changes again and again but delivered very little. When Raúl Castro assumed power in 2008, he began a process of limited changes celebrated by the people as a positive sign, but these were later slowed down by hardliners within the party. The current president Miguel Diaz Canel is vulnerable, lacking the symbolic power (and possibly the capability) to go much further than Raúl Castro. Institutional dynamics and the strengthening of Cold War ideologues during the Trump years have diminished the possibilities for internal change.

..and yet another contributor

Not a Top Priority: Why Joe Biden Embraced Donald Trump’s Cuba Policy

Abstract: After promising during the 2020 campaign to re-engage with Cuba and role back many of President Donald Trump’s sanctions, President Joe Biden took no action during his first six months in office. Cuba policy was still under review when the July 11 protests forced the administration to respond. Under domestic political pressure from Republicans, Cuban Americans in south Florida, and Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, Biden reverted to the confrontational rhetoric typical of U.S. policy during the past six decades and imposed new, albeit largely symbolic, sanctions. As Biden’s first year in office came to a close, the prospects for resurrecting President Barack Obama’s normalization policy appeared dim.
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Early signals suggested that Biden was in no hurry to return to Obama’s policy. In May 2021, the administration reaffirmed, with no real evidence, Trump’s determination that Cuba was not supporting U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The following month, the United States voted in United Nations General Assembly against the annual resolution calling on the United States to lift the embargo. The vote was 184-2, with Israel casting the other negative vote. In 2016, the United States abstained on the resolution, which the UNGA has adopted every year since 1992.

Juan Gonzalez, appointed Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the National Security Council staff, repeatedly voiced skepticism about engagement. “The idea that … a president has to just go back to the way things were with Cuba does not understand our current context,” he said.”[3] Gonzalez also framed engagement as a soft power strategy for regime change: “Engagement is not a gift to a repressive regime. It is a subversive act to advance the cause of human rights and empower the Cuban people as protagonists of their own future.”[4] That framing was certain to poison the prospects for better relations by giving hardliners in Havana ammunition for their “Trojan Horse” argument, first articulated during the Obama administration, that engagement is simply a strategy for regime change by other means.

A Cuba Policy or a Miami Policy?

Biden’s early reluctance to articulate a Cuba policy reflected the administration’s conundrum about how to manage the domestic political risks of keeping Biden’s campaign promise to re-engage. Biden, and Democrats generally, took a beating among Cuban American voters in south Florida in the 2020 election. Trump won more than 60 percent of the Cuban American vote in Miami-Dade—the most since George W. Bush in 2000. Democrats also lost two House seats in south Florida that they thought were safe.[5] This electoral rout made Democrats hyper-sensitive about the domestic political cost of doing anything about Cuba, even though Republicans appealed to Cuban Americans by branding Democrats as socialists more for their domestic rather than their foreign policies. In the 2022 mid-term elections, Democrats hope to win back the two House seats they lost and mount significant challenges to Sen. Marco Rubio and Governor Ron DeSantis.

In Washington, Biden had to contend with Sen. Robert Menendez, the new chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a bitter foe of the Cuban regime. At a February 2021 event sponsored by the Inspire America Foundation, an NGO that supported Trump’s regime change policy toward Cuba, Menendez joined a pantheon of conservative Florida Republicans, including Senator Marco Rubio, Senator Rick Scott, and Representative Mario Díaz-Balart, all of whom denounced Obama’s policy of engagement.[6] The White House bent over backwards to assure Menendez’s cooperation on Biden’s foreign policy agenda by consulting him regularly on Cuba, while pro-engagement legislators found it hard to get an audience at the White House.[7]

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July 11: Cuba Moves Up on the President’s Agenda

The July 11 protests put Cuba in the headlines and forced the issue to the top of the president’s agenda. As videos went viral of Cubans chanting anti-government slogans and fighting with police, avoidance was no longer an option. On July 12, Biden made a brief statement in support of the protestors’ “clarion call for freedom,” and urged the Cuban government to “hear their people and serve their needs at this vital moment rather than enriching themselves.”[12] Republicans demanded that the White House to do more than just make statements. Senator Rubio denounced Biden for not doing enough to help the demonstrators. Conservative Cuban Americans blocked traffic in Miami and demonstrated in front of the White House demanding U.S. military intervention. Some in Florida tried to organize a flotilla of small boats to sail to Cuba in support of the demonstrators—risking a deadly confrontation with Cuban Border Guards. Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, blamed the unrest in Cuba at least in part on the humanitarian crisis there, and urged Biden to relax sanctions to ease the suffering of Cuban families.

In a statement on July 22, Biden tried to placate both sides. He announced new sanctions, all of which had been demanded by Sen. Rubio in a letter to Biden 10 days earlier.[13] The president ordered individual sanctions—known as Global Magnitsky sanctions—against the Cuban minister of the armed forces and a special forces unit of the Ministry of the Interior that deployed as riot police on July 11. Three more rounds of individual sanctions followed over the next few weeks targeting senior officials of the Interior Ministry and armed forces, the national police, and the military police.

Magnitsky sanctions, named for Russian attorney Sergei Magnitsky who died in state custody, target human rights abusers and corrupt actors globally by freezing their assets in the United States and banning their entry. The Cuban sanctions were largely symbolic since none of the people targeted have assets in the United States (if they did, the embargo would freeze them) and none were likely to be applying for visas.

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To mollify pro-engagement Democrats, Biden announced that he was creating a Remittances Working Group to find a way to get remittances to Cuban families with the least possible amount going to the Cuban government. He also affirmed that the State Department was working on how to safely re-staff the U.S. embassy in Havana, which has been operating with a skeleton crew since 2017 because of the mysterious injuries to U.S. personnel that came to be known as the “Havana Syndrome.” Restaffing would allow reopening the consular section for Cubans seeking immigrant visas—a move essential to reducing the risk of another migration crisis. By closing consular services, the Trump administration left most Cubans no safe, legal way to emigrate. Immigrant visas issued to Cubans fell 90% during the Trump years. In the first half of 2021, as the Cuban economic deteriorated, the U.S. Coast Guard saw a significant jump in the number of Cubans trying to cross the Florida Straits on small boats and homemade rafts.

Since July 11, Biden has given the Cuban diaspora a privileged role crafting his policy, calling Cuban Americans “a vital partner” and “the best experts on the issue.”[15] After a number of prior consultations with Cuban Americans by White House officials, on July 19, at the suggestion of Sen. Menendez, Biden met with nine prominent members of the community and promised to “make sure that their voices are included and uplifted at every step of the way.” Just as President Trump out-sourced his Cuba policy to Sen. Rubio, Biden appears to have out-sourced his to Sen. Menendez and the Cuban American diaspora. Not since the China Lobby dictated U.S. policy in East Asia has an exile community exercised such control over U.S foreign policy.

The Biden administration decision to base its Cuba policy on domestic politics was especially galling to Cuban officials, who thought that practice had ended when President Obama decided to normalize relations. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez decried Biden’s White House meeting with Cuban Americans as a “farse to justify regime change.”[16]

The View from Havana

In the streets of Havana, Cubans honked their horns and applauded when Biden’s election was confirmed, anticipating that he would lift Trump’s sanctions.[17] President Miguel Díaz-Canel reiterated Cuba’s willingness to re-engage with Washington, tweeting, “We believe in the possibility of constructive bilateral relations respecting one another’s differences.”[18] In January 2021, Carlos Fernández de Cossio, director general of the U.S. division of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, expressed guarded optimism that the Biden administration would move fairly quickly to reverse Trump’s sanctions.[19]

But as Biden’s policy review dragged on, optimism turned to frustration and anger. The Biden Administration initially said that, as part of its overall policy review, it would reassess Trump’s last minute designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. But in May 2021, it re-affirmed Trump’s designation of Cuba as non-cooperating with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. The Cuban Foreign Ministry angrily rejected the designation as “unfounded and mendacious… irresponsible and shameful,” noting that it was the United States, not Cuba, that had abandoned the counter-terrorism cooperation talks begun by President Obama.[20]

In early July, the State Department reaffirmed another Trump-era designation of Cuba as not making sufficient efforts to curb human trafficking. The dubious claim rested mainly on Cuba’s export of medical services in which Cuban medical personnel serve abroad, despite the fact that President Obama had lauded Cuba’s program of medical internationalism in 2009.[21] Cuba responded angrily to State’s designation, calling the accusation a “lie,” replying that the United States was “itself is among the countries with the worst problems of person trafficking.”[22] Thus bilateral relations were already seriously strained when the protests of July 11 erupted.

The Cuban government’s instinctive reaction to the protests was to blame the United States—both for the embargo’s role in deepening the economic crisis caused by COVID and on U.S. support for regime opponents through “democracy promotion” programs. In his televised speech to the nation on the afternoon of July 11, Díaz-Canel condemned Washington “policy of viciousness” and blamed “a core group of manipulators” for organizing the protests in several cities.[23]

Although Díaz-Canel later admitted that the protestors included Cubans who had real, legitimate grievances that the government had failed to adequately address, the Cuban media focused on the use of the Internet and social media by the U.S. government and Miami exiles to foment a “soft coup”—that is, a mass popular uprising to overthrow the government. As evidence, they could point to a flood of disinformation on July 11 as protestors used social media to mobilize others across the island. Dozens of photographs and videos from other countries were falsely identified as depicting events in Cuba, all revolving around two themes: scenes of massive street demonstrations to convince people to join what was portrayed as a “people’s power” style revolution; and scenes of brutal repression and atrocities aimed at generating moral outrage against the regime.[24].....

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“Cuba is a domestic issue for the United States and not a foreign policy issue,” Brent Scowcroft, President George H. W. Bush’s national security adviser, observed in 1998.[25] Twenty-three years later, not much has changed.

Frustration Boils Over: The Politics of July 11

Abstract: Although the proximate causes of the July 11 demonstrations were the desperate economic situation and the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic raging out of control, the protests also revealed a deep current of dissatisfaction with how Cuba’s political leaders responded to these challenges. The legitimacy of the new “post-Castro” leadership depends upon its performance and in the summer of 2021, many Cubans found it lacking. As Cuban society becomes more stratified, more-market-oriented, and more inter-connected via the Internet, its politics have inevitably become more complex. Social media played a key role enabling Cubans to mobilize in towns and cities across the island on July 11. Cubans officials, who have long enjoyed a monopoly on politics through the leading role of the Communist Party and on information through their control of print and broadcast media, are facing a more activist public demanding a more responsive state. How Cuba’s institutions adapt to this new reality will be the principal determinant shaping the future of Cuban politics.
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The catalyst for the protests that erupted across Cuba on July 11, 2021, was economic desperation caused by the combined shocks of a collapse in tourism because of COVID-19, fuel shortages due to Venezuela’s declining production, U.S. sanctions that blocked most remittances, and inflation stemming from the January 2021 dual currency reform. But the protests also expressed political grievances. Chants of “Libertad!” (Liberty), “Abajo la dictadura” (Down with the dictatorship), “Abajo Comunismo” (Down with Communism), and “Abajo Díaz-Canel” (Down with Díaz-Canel), erupted periodically from the marchers, along with a variety of more profane references to the President Miguel Díaz-Canel.[1]

External economic shocks hit Cuba especially hard because the economy suffers from structural vulnerabilities to begin with. So, too, have the political shocks of the economic crisis hit especially hard because of weaknesses in Cuba’s political institutions. The current economic crisis is the worst since the depression of the “Special Period” in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union—a crisis that touched off the last major street demonstration, the 1994 “Maleconazo” (a riot on the Havana waterfront). The economy in 2021 is not as bad as it was in the 1990s when GDP fell by 35 percent and real incomes fell by more than three-quarters. But the political challenges confronting Cuban authorities are greater.

The Cuban leadership has changed since the 1990s and so has the population. Several key pillars of regime legitimacy have eroded over the ensuing years. Civil society has become more heterogeneous and vocal, and Internet connectivity has enabled Cubans to form virtual social networks of likeminded people outside the government’s control. Finally, the political institutions built in the 1970s to mobilize support have atrophied, leaving many Cubans feeling politically disconnected.

Succession and Legitimacy

Cuba’s economic problems coincide with the generational transition from the founders of the revolutionary regime to the first generation born after 1959, culminating with Miguel Díaz-Canel’s assumption of the presidency in 2018 and leadership of the Communist Party in 2021. Fidel Castro was the quintessential charismatic authority whose political acumen was a cornerstone of the revolutionary regime’s early legitimacy. But the broad popular support enjoyed by the government was never just a matter of personality. Castro delivered on the promises of greater social justice and Cuban independence from the United States—long-standing themes of Cuban political culture. The public outpouring of grief at his death in 2016 showed that many Cubans still venerated him. No one could match Fidel’s charisma, but the other historical leaders also enjoyed a measure of prestige and legitimacy as founders. In April 2021, led by Raúl Castro, they all stepped down from the leadership of the Communist Party, replaced by people born after 1959.

The legitimacy of Cuba’s new leaders depends on their performance, especially their economic performance, which is now at a twenty-five year low. Díaz-Canel has been a firm supporter of Raúl Castro’s policies—first and foremost the economic reform program launched in 2011. His favorite hashtag is “We Are Continuity,” and the 2021 Party Congress was billed as the “Congress of Continuity.” Intended to convey a message of stability, this theme is tone-deaf to the public’s desire for change after too many years of austerity and sacrifice.

During the economic crisis of the 1990s, Cubans who lived through the insurrection against Batista or came of age in the early euphoric years of the revolution were a majority of the adult population and a core base of regime support. Today that generation, in their 70s and 80s, constitutes less than 15 percent of the population.[2] For Cubans who came of age after the fall of the Soviet Union, “The Revolution” has meant persistent economic privation and failed reforms. By large majorities, they are discontented with the economic and political status quo.[3]

Díaz-Canel has stressed the theme of unity, within the party and within the broader public, while promising a more collective and participatory leadership style—a necessary virtue for a president who lacks the inherent authority of being a Castro. Harkening back to Cuba’s struggle for independence, Díaz-Canel has called unity the nation’s “most valuable and sacred force” for the defense of its sovereignty.[4] Yet the national political elite has been divided about the pace and depth of social and economic change for a decade, with the result that the reforms begun in 2011—reforms that raised people’s expectations for greater prosperity— have been slow and halting. The urgent need to respond to the contemporary economic crisis and the political discontent manifested on July 11, puts significant pressure on elite decision-making between those who see the crisis as reason for retrenchment and those who see it as reason for accelerating reforms.

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Grievance and Accountability

There is no shortage of grievances in Cuba over the poor state of the economy. In every independent opinion poll taken in Cuba since 2005, the economy has been reported to be the most important issue facing the nation.[9] The high hopes people had for economic growth as a result of Raúl Castro’s economic reform program and the normalization of relations with the United States have been dashed. The combined shocks of U.S. sanctions, COVID-19, and exchange rate reform have plunged the economy into deep recession. Discontent is especially high among Cubans below the age of 60 who are too young to remember pre-revolutionary Cuba or the euphoria of the revolution’s early years.

Cubans of African descent—once among the most solid supporters of the revolution -- have been disproportionately among the losers in the new economy. Because some 90 percent of the Cubans who went into exile after 1959 were white, few Afro-Cubans have relatives abroad to send them remittances to bolster their standard of living or provide the seed capital to start a business. Because Afro-Cubans are more likely to live in decaying neighborhoods, they have fewer opportunities to rent rooms to visiting foreigners. Afro-Cubans have been less likely to find jobs in the tourist sector where workers supplement their state salaries with hard currency tips.[10] It was not coincidental that many of the demonstrations on July 11 began in the poorer neighborhoods of Cuban cities.

Cuban political institutions have done a poor job of responding to popular grievances in recent years, leaving many Cubans with a sense of disconnection from the regime. Cuba’s one-party system has its roots not so much in Leninism as in Cuba’s own political culture. Division among Cubans doomed the first War of Independence in 1868 and a quarter century later, José Martí was intent upon uniting Cubans in a single revolutionary party to battle Spain. Since at least 1997, the Cuban Communist Party has claimed legitimacy for its political monopoly by citing this history and the need for Cuban patriots to remain united in the face of U.S. efforts to restore its political and economic dominance over the island.[11]

But political monopolies, like economic ones, have no competitors to compel them to stay in touch with the preferences of their constituents. The Cuban political system has mass organizations that serve as mechanisms for mobilizing supporters, but their role, for the most part, has been to promote government policy to their respective constituencies, rather than represent their constituents’ interests to the government. Since the 1970s, Cuba has held elections that offer some opportunity for people to hold local legislators accountable, but at the national level, only one candidate is nominated for each National Assembly seat and in almost thirty years, no nominee has ever been defeated.

At the First National Party Congress in 2012, Raúl Castro called for the revitalization of the Communist Party by repairing weaknesses that had developed over the preceding decade. The Party had been drawn into the administration of state agencies, interfering with the role of the government bureaucracy, and neglecting its political work. Its endless meetings had degenerated into “formalism,” in which no real criticism was ever voiced, and little was accomplished, thereby “spreading dissatisfaction and apathy” among the membership. The result of these failings was a loss of the Party’s ties to broader public, for whom the Party seemed remote and inaccessible.[12] Another indicator of the Party’s tenuous standing was an 18 percent decline in membership from 2011 to 2016—the first decline since the Party was founded in 1965.

In his report to the 2021 Party Congress, Raúl Castro reiterated many of the themes from the 2012 Conference. The Party was still interfering with government administration rather than focusing on political work. “We have been repeating this for more than 60 years and, really, it must be said that very little has been accomplished,” Castro complained. The “moral authority” for the Party’s privileged position had to come from “the broadest democracy and the permanent, sincere and profound exchange of opinions, not always agreeing; strengthening ties with the working masses and the population, and ensuring the growing participation of citizens in making fundamental decisions.” But on the ideological front, “I am not satisfied with the progress achieved.”

In Cuba’s poor neighborhoods, people do not see “las organizaciones” (the state, party, and mass organizations) as responsive to their needs. As one woman says in the 2014 film, Canción de Barrio, “We are excluded people.” The consequences of that exclusion were starkly visible on July 11, as young people, who clearly saw the police as their enemy, tried to drive them out of their neighborhoods with barrages of rocks and bottles. Even after they smashed and overturned police cars, they continued to pelt these broken symbols of authority with stones.

The challenge for the Cuban government is how to regain the trust of a population long frustrated by anemic economic performance and the slow pace of reform, and now pushed beyond the limits of endurance by the current economic crisis and pandemic. This political dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the government does not have the resources to end the current shortages and relieve people’s misery. People want help, but the government has little to give.....

..if someone is living on the street struggling to survive what difference does it make to that person what the political system is. 

Canadians view foreign politics

..you're a fucking canadian. to view your opinion as being superior to other canadians is paternalistic and arrogant. that you can't form an argument without attacking people, some who you even consider an ally is out of line for a discussion board. at least this one. makes me not want to talk to you.

The International Reaction to 11-J

Abstract: This article examines the international reaction to the events in Cuba of July 11. It shows that, with few exceptions, many countries were concerned at the Cuban security forces’ reaction to the protests but refused to accept the position of the U.S. government. Particularly noteworthy were the reactions of the Latin American and Caribbean nations.
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While most media attention understandably focused on the stunning domestic events of July 11, 2021 in Cuba, the international reaction was also noteworthy—in part because of some unexpected developments.  The United States reaction was one of condemnation of the Cuban government, and support for those protesting. The nature of the Biden administration’s position is summarized well by the president´s official statement of July 12: “We stand with the Cuban people and their clarion call for freedom and relief from the tragic grip of the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by Cuba’s authoritarian regime” (Biden 2021).

But how did the international community react? Did it support the “clarion call for freedom,” and accept the revolutionary government’s defense of its actions, or stand on the ideological sidelines and await the outcome of the street protests? Were there any surprises in the reactions of any countries, or did they basically follow their traditional politically aligned positions? This chapter seeks to analyze the international response to the events of July 11 and its aftermath.

The protests of July 11 took place during one of the worst periods of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the ongoing medical emergency was clearly one factor in the widespread disturbances which erupted that day. Cubans were frustrated by the high numbers of people affected, a situation that had only deteriorated in recent months. The international response to the pandemic in Cuba was therefore a response to the humanitarian crisis as well as (in some cases) a reflection of political support for the government. Unsurprisingly, therefore, much of the aid which was donated to Cuba came from countries with similar political views.

Planeloads of medical supplies came from China, Russia, Bolivia and Argentina, for example. Nicaragua sent two shiploads of food, while Venezuela sent 20 tons of rice and 30 shipping containers of food. Vietnam sent 12,000 tons of rice. Mexico sent three navy ships with food supplies and fuel. Japan sent 25 lung ventilators and 157,000 syringes. Italy, Jamaica and Thailand sent personal protective equipment, while the Dominican Republic shipped 12 tons of medical supplies, and further medical support came from several Caribbean countries (St. Kitts and Nevis, Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia). Associations of Cuban residents in several countries, solidarity organizations in many others, unions and nongovernmental organizations also shipped medical supplies and food.

While this humanitarian aid was an indication of support for the Cuban government it had little to do with the broader issue of how the international community regarded the dramatic events of 11-J.  As mentioned, Washington strongly condemned the reaction of the Cuban government to the popular protests and called on its allies to follow suit. Its July 25th “Joint Statement on Cuba” ended with a dire warning: “The international community will not waver in its support for the Cuban people and all those who stand up for basic freedoms all people deserve” (United States Department of State 2021). Significantly US allies, including Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Portugal declined to support this U.S. initiative. European countries, most of which had condemned the US embargo of Cuba several months earlier at the UN General Assembly, were largely disinterested in taking sides. This can be illustrated by the limited European support for the statement--particularly among the continent’s leading powers. The European countries which supported it were generally the smallest and least wealthy--Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland and the Ukraine.

That said, the European Union as an organization did not hesitate in supporting the position taken by Washington. Four days after the “Joint Statement” the EU leadership issued a press release noting that the demonstrations reflected “legitimate grievances in the population about the lack of food, medicines, water and power, as well as freedoms of expression and freedom of the press,” which had now resulted “in the demand for civil and political rights, and for democracy” (Council of the European Union 2021).

This official statement, issued by Josep Borrell, in effect the foreign minister of the EU, was extremely direct. It expressed concern about the repression of the demonstrators and stated categorically: “We unequivocally support the right of all Cuban citizens to express their views peacefully, to make demands for change, as well as to assemble to give voice to their opinions, including in the Internet”. The EU also called for the release “all arbitrarily detailed protestors, to listen to the voices of its citizens, and to engage in an inclusive dialogue on heir grievances”.

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One of the most surprising discussions in Washington about the events of July 11 revolved around the involvement of the Organization of American States (OAS). On July 26 an emergency meeting of members was called (to be held two days later) to discuss the situation in Cuba.  Washington Abdala, Uruguayan ambassador to the OAS and president of the Permanent Council, was keen to focus on the human rights situation and the July 11 disturbances. He condemned the situation on the island: “What Cuba is living through now must be dealt with immediately. We are talking about hundreds of people being denied their freedom, of having their human rights being affected” (AP News 2021). [All translations from the Spanish original have been made by the author].

The request by Almagro to hold this emergency session of the OAS was roundly condemned by Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations. In fact, on July 26 they wrote to President Biden, calling upon him to lift the US embargo of Cuba “so that all the rights to which the Cuban state and its people are entitled can be respected and upheld” (Sanders 2021). In all, 13 CARICOM countries requested that the meeting be cancelled. Eventually, when it was clear that a significant number of member countries were opposed to the meeting, it was dropped by the OAS leadership.

The significance of this diplomatic episode is worth noting, particularly its denouement. Traditionally the OAS, and especially under the leadership of Almagro, has supported Washington’s policies in the region. It was expected that this meeting would add to a campaign of international condemnation of events in Cuba, and support Washington’s position on Cuba. But the idea of showing Cuba to be rejected by the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean failed. Instead, it showed the support for Cuba of many of the countries in the region, and indeed the isolation of the US position. Sir Ronald Sanders, the ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda to the OAS and coordinator of the CARICOM group there, expressed with clarity the feeling of many countries:

No possible useful purpose will be served by any meeting to discuss Cuba. The OAS can enforce nothing on it. Any discussion can only satisfy political hawks with an eye on US mid-term elections, where winning South Florida with the backing of Cuban exiles would be a prize. The task of the OAS should be to promote peaceful and cooperative relations in the hemisphere, not to feed division and conflict. (Sanders 2021).

The position of the Canadian government was more ambiguous. During the Covid-19 pandemic Canada has also provided material support for Cuba, including: 300,000 Covid test kits, $300,000 to the Pan American Health Organization for the procurement of medical supplies; $100,000 through CARE for seniors and sanitary personnel in seniors’ residences; $50,000 through OXFAM for awareness training; $1 million through the World Food Program for the purchase of rice, peas and lentils; and $950,000 through UNICEF for medical supplies (Personal correspondence with Canadian officials 2021).

That said, the government was clearly shocked by the events of July 11, and the Canadian media were critical of both the Cuban government’s repression of dissent and the violence shown by security forces. On July 23 Marc Garneau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla. An official government statement made clear Canada’s position: “Minister Garneau expressed Canada’s deep concern over the violent crackdown on protests in Cuba, particularly the repressive measures against peaceful protestors, journalists and activists, and arbitrary detention. The people of Cuba deserve their full rights to freedom of speech an assembly, as well as democracy” (Government of Canada 2021).

Far less critical was the position of Mexico, which played down the questions of social frustration and government repression. Instead, it focused attention on the punitive aspects of the US embargo and called for the Biden administration to adopt a more humanitarian approach to Cuba. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) condemned the US embargo of Cuba and reminded Mexicans of the near-universal rejection of the US policy at the United Nations General Assembly: “It is not conceivable that in these times somebody would wish to punish an independent country with a blockade. Moreover, almost all the countries in the world are opposed to this blockade against Cuba” (Reyes 2021). He went further, offering personal advice to Biden: “you need to separate politics from humanitarian needs. Life is the most important value and is the very basis of all human rights”. 

In addition to showing significant independence toward Cuba, AMLO also offered a message to the international community, encouraging countries who had voted against the US embargo to follow up and provide tangible support for Cuba: “It’s not sufficient to just vote against the blockade every year at the UN. Let me take advantage of this opportunity and make an appeal to all countries in the World, asking you to convert your vote against the blockade into actions, and help the Cuban people” (Reyes 2001). Mexico certainly followed up, sending three ships with food (powdered milk, beans, flower, oil and tinned goods), medical supplies (oxygen, syringes, personal protection equipment), and fuel (100,000 barrels of diesel) to the island. In the past some emergency aid had been sent to Cuba following hurricanes, but never anything of this magnitude.

López Obrador described the US embargo in his morning addresses as an “extreme measure,” inhumane” and a “medieval act” (Verza 2021). Given Mexico’s pro tempore leadership of the Community of Latin American States (CELAC), and his comments on both Cuba’s resistance to the US embargo and the need to replace the Organization of American States “with an organization that is truly autonomous, and not a lackey of any nation” (Verza 2021), AMLO’s message to the US neighbor and major trading partner was clear. The high profile visit of President Díaz-Canel to Mexico in September to celebrate the anniversary of Mexican independence allowed AMLO to express support for Cuba, a country which “like few in the world, has known how to defend with dignity its right to be free and independent, without permitting the interference in internal matters of any foreign power” (La Jornada 2021).

The greatest supporters of the Cuban government in the wake of the events of July 11 were, not surprisingly, China and Russia. North Korea also provided moral support, while Vietnam donated 12,000 tons of rice and President Nguyen Xuan Phuc spoke with his Cuban counterpart to express his confidence in the revolutionary government. China, increasingly a geopolitical and commercial rival of the United States particularly in the Global South, expressed its strong support for Havana. Three major donations of medical supplies (22 and 24 tons in the last two flights) were sent.  On August 4 the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a formal declaration condemning US policy: “China firmly opposes any move to arbitrarily impose unilateral sanctions and interfere in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of so-called ‘freedom,’ ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’… We urge the U.S. to heed the universal appeal of the international community, immediately, and completely lift the sanctions and embargo against Cuba, and immediately stop making excuses to engage in gross interference and destabilization” (Ross 2001).

Just as valuable for the beleaguered Cuban government as the badly needed medical supplies was the political support from Beijing. On August 30 President Xi Jinping held a phone conversation with Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel. The most important areas of discussion, according to the Chinese foreign ministry, focused on their countries’ longstanding bilateral ties, ideological similarities, and development goals. The Chinese president termed them “a model of solidarity and cooperation between developing countries”. He offered increased collaboration in several strategic areas: “China is ready to intensify high-level exchanges with Cuba, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning in the governance of part and state, deepen anti-pandemic cooperation on international and multilateral occasions to safeguard the common interests of developing countries” (Xi Jinping Speaks 2021).

Cuba’s traditional ally Russia also provided political and humanitarian support. On July 26 some 88 tons of food and medical equipment arrived in Cuba, followed by a second planeload of humanitarian aid (28 tonnes of medicines and two tonnes of flour) on August 12. Later that month Presidents Vladimir Putin and Díaz-Canel participated in a phone conversation to discuss the situation in Cuba, and potential avenues of cooperation. Díaz-Canel thanked Russia for its generous support and used the opportunity to confirm the “excellent state of bilateral relations and the importance of strengthening economic, commercial and financial ties, and cooperation” (Redacción OnCuba). An official Kremlin summary of the conversation emphasized “the strategic nature of Russian-Cuban partnership that is rooted in old traditions of friendship and mutual support” (Tass August 25, 2021......

..more from above

quote:

From Facebook to the streets: virtual spaces become real

On April 7, 2019 hundreds of people marched through Vedado in a procession against animal cruelty, organized through Facebook. Beatriz Batista, of the Cuban digital pet magazine El Arca, was granted permission by the Consejo de Administracion Municipal de Plaza to host a procession with other animal rights activists on 23rd Avenue, from Coppelia to the Colón Cemetery (Weissenstein 2019, EFE 2019). The procession was the first in decades organized by non-state actors to receive a permit for a march on Havana streets. That Fall, after posting alerts that stray dogs were being rounded up and euthanized in the city in advance of the King of Spain’s visit, a group of activists protested outside the office responsible for the roundup and succeeded in freeing 10 animals set to be euthanized (Batista 2019).

Organizing through social media and with the favorable coverage in Cuban independent media, they called for the government to approve an animal welfare law. In response, the National Assembly slated the Animal Welfare Law for consideration first in November 2020 and then in February 2021, because of the pandemic. But in late-February 2021, after the National Assembly failed to act on the legislation, animal welfare activists protested outside the Ministry of Agriculture. Less than a week later, on February 26, 2021, the Council of State approved a new Animal Welfare Law (Cuba Debate 2021).

Summer 2021

In the early summer of 2021, the daily COVID case counts on state media paired with alarming reports posted on social media from the province of Matanzas painted a picture of a crisis that, for the first time since COVID-19 was first detected on the island in March 2020, had surpassed the ability of the public health system to respond. Videos showed sick people languishing in the hallways of health centers and waiting in blocks-long queues for testing and treatment. Through private chats on WhatsApp, friends and relatives in the province confirmed the reports, and called for help.

Cubans had watched for more than a year news programs about health systems collapsing under the strain of COVID-19 cases from New York City to Milan. Now the unthinkable was happening in Cuba, despite months of strict measures that included nightly curfews, limitations on mobility, closed schools and workplaces, and closed borders. With flights to Cuba virtually at a standstill, it was nearly impossible for people to send material aid from abroad. New Trump-Era U.S. restrictions on sending remittances to Cuba made receiving funds from abroad similarly difficult. The same networks that provided aid in southern Havana neighborhoods after the tornado reactivated in order to raise money on the island to buy medicines only available at high prices on the Havana black market to send to Matanzas. As the number of new cases began to rise, Ahora Sí activists stopped their in-person activities and many turned their energies to collecting donations for Matanzas.

Meanwhile, the #soscuba hashtag emerged to bring attention to the sanitary crisis in Matanzas and call for donations. Social media users outside of Cuba had their own uses for the hashtag that reflected their own agendas, from relief from customs duties to humanitarian corridors and military intervention. Less than a week later, people in San Antonio de los Baños (Artemisa province) and Palma Soliano (Santiago de Cuba province) took to the streets in the unprecedented protests of J11.

Conclusion

In this paper I have highlighted a few examples that show how social networks have become central to everyday life on the island for a growing group of Connected Cubans. Using social media and social networks to engage in activism in new ways, people who did not previously participate in political activities are becoming activists, changing their relationship with the state. As Cubans connect online, the state is also moving to populate the new digital commons. Cuban leaders are moving to social media, setting up Twitter accounts and beginning to use Facebook Live to stream everything from the daily morning COVID updates to presidential addresses (Inventario 2021). Important policy decisions are even communicated through Facebook (MINED 2021). Cuban state media reports quote Facebook user comments in their reporting, possibly opening a new channel of dialogue. Since Cubans outside the island are often those with greatest access, these spaces may contribute to expanding and renegotiating citizenship, allowing them to continue to participate in internal debates as citizens about the present and future of the country.

..recently i ditched facebook. not that i used it for a couple years but i was connected to family and friends through messenger. because i dumped facebook i lost 1/2 those connections. 

..not long after that liberation i found myself setting up a fake identity and creating a new facebook page in order to continue to follow many indigenous struggles in canada plus a load of other activist pages.