Myanmar - Rebels are Winning the War Against the Brutal Military Dictatorship

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jerrym
Myanmar - Rebels are Winning the War Against the Brutal Military Dictatorship

A united front against the 60 year military tyranny in Myanmar is increasingly winning the war. 

A young fighter looks out from the upper floor in a concrete skeleton of a church that villagers have been building for two years in this small pocket of southeast Myanmar. The construction work has been a slow undertaking, said 21-year-old Zayar, a member of Myanmar’s Muslim community who moved from the country’s biggest city, Yangon, to this rebel camp near the Thai border to fight against his country’s military rulers.

Air strikes by military warplanes are a constant threat in this hamlet in Karen State – also known as Kayin – where jobs are scarce and money is tight. But, little by little, the ethnic Karen here were able to build their church. “Before, we thought the Karen people were dacoits [bandits],” said Zayar, who joined the rebellion against Myanmar’s military just last year. “Now people understand the real situation,” he told Al Jazeera. Zayar’s opinion of the Karen – one of Myanmar’s largest minorities – was shaped by disparaging depictions and stereotypes circulated under the country’s military generals, who primarily hail from the ethnic Bamar majority and have violently suppressed the aspirations of Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups for decades.

The Myanmar military’s attempts to pressure the country’s minorities into submission – stretching as far back as the 1940s – fuelled one of the longest-running conflicts in the world. Now as military leaders mark their third year since seizing power in Myanmar, an uprising that melds the decades-old ethnic struggles for self-determination with the more recent armed fight to restore democracy has enveloped much of the nation.

In October, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), based in the Mandarin-speaking region of Kokang on the border with China, along with two other powerful ethnic armed groups, as well as Bamar fighters, launched their offensive against the military. The collaboration – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – has scored unprecedented victories against Myanmar’s military, which toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in February 2021.

Resistance to the country’s military rulers is now a broad church and confidence in the movement and its campaign has been massively boosted by the participation of a growing number of armed actors. However, the alliance’s common cause of removing the military from power remains set against a complex history of rivalries and suspicions between a multitude of ethnic armed groups – divisions which the military has successfully exploited to its benefit in the past. As the alliance’s offensive moves from the countryside to urban areas in the west, north and east of Myanmar, the military is struggling to find a way back, and some fear the collaboration among the rebels will not hold together.

Unity of purpose

Unity, says Myanmar political analyst Kim Jolliffe, stands as the overriding factor in the success of the current armed revolt. Being unified is not only necessary for military success, said Jolliffe, but also for laying the foundation of a post-military Myanmar. Unity, he said, will be key to moving the country away from a “highly coercive centralised state” that “creates perpetual conflict” to one where “all ethnic groups are equal in a genuine power-sharing mechanism. The central problem that the revolution must solve is how to create a system that enhances the diversity and create a power balance so that no single group positions themselves as overarching chauvinist controllers,” Jolliffe told Al Jazeera. “We will likely continue to see localised conflicts and tensions among resistance groups in some areas. But there is little to suggest that it will have a fundamental impact on the overall direction of the revolution,” he added.

While some ethnic forces have aligned with the military or have remained neutral, most of the country’s formidable ethnic armed groups have poured their resources and troops into the current campaign against the generals.

“Living under the dictatorship is worse than death,” he says. “I will fight back until I die.” For Zayar, he is fighting for equality. Being of the Muslim faith in predominately Buddhist Myanmar, some have called him a “kalar” – a term used as a slur against Muslims or anyone of South Asian origin in Myanmar. His official Myanmar national identity card also marks him out as a “Muslim”, not only as his religion but also as an ethnic identity, he says. “When the government put me as that, I felt discriminated,” he told Al Jazeera. “I was born and raised in Myanmar. Of course, I’m Myanmar.” ...

On the military’s side, people are unwilling to fight for coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, who has overseen an unceasing chain of atrocities against civilians across the country since seizing power. News outlets such as Frontier Myanmar and Radio Free Asia have reported the military snatching young men off the streets at night and threatening to burn down villages as a way to secure recruits and boost their numbers. Due to the military’s postcoup violence driving peaceful protesters to seek combat training under the guidance of ethnic rebels, the regime’s once inexperienced opponents have developed into battle-hardened fighters. Troop movements by the military have become rarer. Mostly it relies on air strikes and heavy weaponry from fortified positions. Mass surrenders by regime troops have reinforced notions of sinking morale among the rank and file.

Discontent within the military at Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership has also stirred persistent rumours that the coup leader may be overthrown himself by his comrades in arms. In the opposing camp, fighters such as Zayar understand the importance of maintaining unity with other groups in the fight to free Myanmar from military rule. But there is a paradox in Zayar and others joining splinter armed groups, such as the KTLA, which could in the long run lead to disunity in the war against the military regime. ...

Zayar’s commander, Lar Phoe, 30, points towards a plume of smoke rising from a hillside. The military had burned and abandoned their own outpost two days previous, he said. “If they didn’t, they may not have got the chance to retreat again,” Phoe, heavy-set and hobbling in a sleeveless traditional Karen tunic, told Al Jazeera. Under Phoe’s command are about 70 men and four women of mixed ethnicities. Many are from the cities. Wielding a mix of rifles and semiautomatic guns, they form a line and salute every time a car enters the camp. “I never imagined a situation in which Bamar, and other ethnic people, would be under my command,” he said, reflecting on the disunity of the Karen and hoping the KTLA and KNU could be “united as one”. “The nature of revolution is unity,” he said. “It is the path to work as one. If the leaders are united, the rest of the forces would unite.”

https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/3/myanmars-rebels-see-unity-as...–%20known%20as%20the,civilian%20government%20in%20February%202021.

jerrym

The rebel forces have increasingly gained ground against the Myanmar military. 

Since late October, a coordinated offensive by resistance forces in Myanmar has posed a stiff challenge to the ruling military that overthrew the democratically elected government three years ago. The coup triggered a civil war that is gaining force today, especially since the autumn start of the rebel groups’ Operation 1027. Although their advances are not definitive, they do raise questions about the staying power of the military junta.

Much of Myanmar’s history since it achieved independence from Britain in 1948 has been a struggle between the military (or Tatmadaw) and resistance from myriad ethnic armed groups and opposition parties. The latest shift in the balance of power came when the Tatmadaw on February 1, 2021, ousted the ruling National League of Democracy, led by democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains jailed three years later. The coup, which came just months after the 2020 election, ravaged the country’s economy, increased its international isolation and triggered upheaval, with thousands dead and millions already displaced in the nation of 54 million people.

The resistance forces are comprised of the People’s Defense Forces aligned with the shadow National Unity Government, with support from segments of ethnic armed organizations. Together, they have since claimed control of more than half of the country’s territory, while the junta, ruling under the State Administration Council, has been riven with defections and internal divisions. In the weeks following the start of Operation 1027, even junta officials admitted that the country risks breaking apart.

The outcome of the civil war has implications not only for the country but also for the region. Because Myanmar is strategically located between China and India, and connected to mainland Southeast Asia, continued deterioration of the situation could leave a failed state at an important crossroads. The country would suffer even worse economic repercussions and export instability to the region, as we are already seeing with instances like sprawling regional scam networks. Myanmar could also become a potential breeding ground for international criminal networks, not to mention a battleground for intensified competition between major powers.

The broader question is how Myanmar’s civil war will evolve. Most independent counts put rebel forces at less than 100,000 fighters, with much less weaponry, firepower and financing capacity. Despite this, the anti-coup forces have made significant ground against the Tatmadaw, which had an estimated pre-coup strength of between 200,000 and 350,000 soldiers.

While resistance forces have shown an ability to coordinate and gain ground on the battlefield, building on these successes while maintaining historically fragile unity among diverse groups is no easy task. Meanwhile, though the Tatmadaw is beset by challenges, its record of harshly suppressing enemies since the 1940s suggests that it is likely to continue to cling to power at all costs, including more brutal military tactics and possibly even sham elections in an attempt to establish legitimacy.

Furthermore, while assistance from countries like the United States could tip the scales in favor of the resistance, the interests of other actors will affect the ruling State Administration Council’s ability to sustain fighting at home and weather isolation abroad. China and Russia, for instance, back the military junta. But neighboring Thailand, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 10-nation alliance that includes Myanmar, are also potentially influential. Myanmar has been excluded from the last two annual ASEAN summits because of the coup, but the association has struggled to adopt a common position.

Scenarios

Most likely: No end to war in sight

The most likely scenario is one of protracted conflict. The resistance forces would continue to make sporadic gains in outlying areas, but not enough, particularly in most urban areas, to defeat the junta. Meanwhile, the military would intensify brutal efforts in a bid to gain the upper hand, including indiscriminate violence to spread fear among civilians and targeted offensives meant to deepen divisions among the People’s Defense Forces and the ethnic armed organizations.

The continued trading of blows would increase the spillover effect of Myanmar’s civil war, with more refugees flowing into South and Southeast Asia. The international battle for legitimacy would also continue to play out. Some countries would support the National Unity Government while other actors, including ASEAN, would adopt a more hedged position.

A more extreme version of this scenario would see Myanmar fracture. Though the State Administration Council would still claim to rule a single Myanmar, actual power would reside in local armed groups. These include ethnic armed organizations that operate independently and focus on control of their territories.

Less likely: Decisive victory for anti-coup forces

A victory for anti-coup forces and the unraveling of the military regime is less likely, although the possibility has grown. In this scenario, the resistance would be able to pull off a string of multi-theater successes that either result in a negotiated outcome in their favor or the junta’s surrender.

The capabilities of the People’s Defense Forces have improved, raising hopes that the resistance can seize select strategic urban areas and demoralize the military. If the tide begins to turn decisively, external actors, including China, may then push the junta to negotiate a settlement with the rebels to protect their own interests. However, any negotiated outcome will be challenging. The military is deeply distrusted after it reneged on a previous power-sharing agreement with the National League of Democracy government. Moreover, it will be difficult to keep the People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations united.

Least likely: Military wins

A victory for the military is the least likely scenario. Yet the Tatmadaw’s staying power should not be underestimated. Declining unity and coordination among anti-coup forces could translate into battlefield setbacks, especially if coupled with a lack of international assistance. This could play into the Tatmadaw’s ability to employ a divide-and-conquer approach that splits the resistance and diminishes its popular support. It would also buy the junta time to patch up challenges it faces and wear the resistance down using tactics to boost recruitment and secure more weapons purchases from its chief backers. Given all of this, a reversal that sees the Tatmadaw prevail cannot be ruled out.  

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/myanmar-civil-war-2/

jerrym

In February the rebels have continued to make gains but still face significant problems. "With support for Myanmar’s military junta declining and rebels gaining ground through unprecedented cooperation, 2024 could prove a pivotal year in the country’s civil war. Indeed, the military has lost control of scores of towns and military bases in recent months. These advances don’t necessarily spell victory for Myanmar rebels, but they are weighing on the junta – and reinvigorating the resistance."  The rebels now claim that they "now control 60% of the country".

To many outsiders, Myanmar appears to be locked in a bloody stalemate. The ongoing civil war has killed more than 4,000 people and left 2.6 million displaced within the country, according to United Nations estimates. Every third person – about 18.6 million people – now requires humanitarian aid, a nineteenfold increase since the February 2021 military coup that overthrew Myanmar’s elected government. 

But as the war enters its fourth year, there are signs of a shift. 

This weekend, the junta announced that it would start enforcing a 14-year-old compulsory military service law, effective immediately. The draft comes as Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the country’s military ruler and architect of the 2021 coup, faces calls to step down after a wave of humiliating losses to allied resistance groups. 

Where have the rebels made gains?

The junta faces many enemies, including pro-democracy groups formed by civilians after the coup and various armed ethnic groups that have long fought for autonomy. Historically, these different groups have fought alone, planning attacks and negotiating cease-fires in relative isolation. 

The status quo started to shift in October, when three insurgent groups known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched “Operation 1027” to take on junta troops in northern Shan state near the border with China. Analysts say the operation had tacit backing from Beijing, which wanted to punish the junta over its failure to curb online scams operating out of Myanmar. The campaign was incredibly successful. Within days, the alliance captured more than 50 junta bases and shut down major border crossings. 

Other armed groups, including the Chin National Army, supported the operation by launching attacks around their own areas of control, forcing the junta to respond on multiple fronts. As the parallel offensives gained momentum, the junta witnessed some demoralizing defeats. In late January, hundreds of junta soldiers fled across the border to India, and many more have surrendered in the face of bold ground and drone attacks. 

The National Unity Government, an anti-junta body that oversees many of the newer civilian groups, claims that junta opponents now control 60% of the country. That control remains largely peripheral, with rebels failing to claim a single central city or major military infrastructure. 

What challenges do resistance groups face?

While resistance groups have demonstrated their ability to mount coordinated attacks, they are still fractured and lack a central command. Most work for their own goals, which do not necessarily resonate with other groups. 

“The resistance is faced with the difficult task of crafting a shared political vision,” says Angshuman Choudhury, a former associate fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. “This is not an easy task in a country with hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups.”

On top of that, fighters continue to deal with ammunition and weapons shortages, whereas the junta has critical access to heavy weapons, mainly from Russian suppliers. Nevertheless, resistance leaders say there will be more surprise strikes against the junta this year. 

“The resistance groups have never been so strong against the junta,” says Ram Kulh Cung, a Chin National Army commander. “There is some sort of coordination between the resistance groups, and we are working towards making it better and much stronger with one aim – to throw the junta out of power and restore democracy.”

How is the junta responding?

Despite growing frustration among the ranks, the junta is not giving up.  Militarily, its focus “has been to both reclaim fallen towns and degrade resistance assets,” says Mr. Choudhury. “It continues to rely on airstrikes and artillery offensives against civilian populations in order to cut them off from the resistance groups. It has also adopted an online counterpropaganda program to discredit the resistance among the masses.”

How the junta is responding internally is less clear. The junta has not addressed criticism directly, but it did activate the military draft and extend Myanmar’s state of emergency for another six months to restore “a normal state of stability and peace,” according to a military-run media outlet. This confers Gen. Min Aung Hlaing legislative, judicial, and executive powers and will further delay elections. Yet with Gen. Min Aung Hlaing at his weakest position since the coup, some speculate that he could be replaced with another senior military officer.

What is evident, say analysts, is that the junta is doing damage control, and hope for rebel victory – and postwar stability – rests on its opponents’ ability to continue cooperating.

https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2024/0213/Myanmar-s-c...

jerrym

The military junta has suffered severe casualties prompting it to introduce coscription as it continued to lose territory in mid-February. They have also lost several thousand soldiers who deserted to the rebel side. 

 The Myanmar's military conscription plan reveals the heavy toll that months of incessant fighting against rebels have had on its troops and the struggles the generals are facing to replenish their ranks, analysts, diplomats and a defector said.

The plan, which was announced this week, comes after the junta lost control of swathes of territory along a frontline that stretches from the highlands bordering China to the coastline near Bangladesh, some of it in a coordinated offensive by rebel groups that started in October, dubbed Operation 1027.

"The military is clearly facing significant manpower shortages, which is why it is introducing a draft for the first time in its history," said Richard Horsey, the Crisis Group's senior Myanmar adviser.

A junta spokesman did not respond to calls from Reuters seeking comment. The military has been battling an expanding armed resistance since a 2021 coup toppled the democratically elected government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, and the junta describes the resistance fighters as "terrorists", blaming them for destroying Myanmar's peace and stability....

"There has been a notable decline in the number of officer enlistments as well," he told Reuters. "Additionally, the loss of officers, including Brigadier Generals...have been significantly higher due to shrinking battalion sizes and decreasing rank-and-file soldiers."

Miemie Winn Byrd, an analyst who previously served in the U.S. army, said defections had risen sharply in the past few months, based on interviews with military battalion commanders and other soldiers who had deserted.

"Myanmar's military forces are fatigued and demoralised," she said, adding that basic supplies such as food and equipment were in short supply.

Former army captain Htet Myat, who defected in June 2021 and now helps other soldiers defect, told Reuters in December that some battalions only had around 130 soldiers. Htet Myat said he defected because he opposed the 2021 coup.

The military's battlefield defeats have lead to unprecedented public calls for Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing to step down three years after the junta took power from the civilian government.

Even with the mandatory recruitment, the military may not be able to rapidly ramp up its manpower, said Crisis Group's Horsey. "It does not have the organisational capability to train large numbers of new recruits simultaneously," he added.

A dozen people eligible to serve also told Reuters that they would rather leave the country than join the military. They all declined to be named citing security concerns.

At its current strength, the military does not have the manpower to effectively fight opposition troops on multiple fronts, according to a December analysis by Andrew Selth, an adjunct professor at the Griffith Asia Institute.

"The generals know how thinly spread their troops are, and how difficult it is to fight more than one major battle at the same time," said Selth, who has studied Myanmar, particularly the military, for decades.

"The use of air power, armour and artillery gives the junta certain advantages, but ultimately only troops on the ground can win back territory and exert its will over the population."

In the western region of Rakhine, where the military is fighting the Arakan Army (AA), troops have been pushed out of at least five towns, a spokesman for the ethnic armed group said. The military has not publicly commented on the loss of territory.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-juntas-conscription-p...

jerrym

Wikipedia has a full description of the civil war as well as the events led up to it. I have included the events from 2024 below from Wikipedia's description. 

2024 offensives[edit]

In late November and December, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) closed in on Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone as a continuation of Operation 1027. They seized several strategic positions during the Battle of Laukkai.[275] MNDAA forces attacked junta bases around the city, including the Four Buddhist Statues Hill outpost immediately south of Laukkai.[276] On 26 December, over 90 of the junta's 55th Light Infantry Division surrendered to the MNDAA.[277] The artillery shelling of Laukkai stopped and the city mostly fell under MNDAA control on 28 December.[278] On 5 January 2024, the MNDAA seized control of the Northeast Command's headquarters in Laukkai and gained full control of the city.[8]

A few days later, the Three Brotherhood Alliance claimed to capture the towns of Kutkai and Theinni on 8 January after seizing junta military posts in the towns, including the headquarters of the 16th Military Operations Command in Theinni.[279] On 23 January, three of the brigadier generals who surrendered at Laukkai were sentenced to death and the other three were sentenced to life imprisonment, under military law.[280]

Tenuous ceasefire[edit]

In early December, the Tatmadaw allegedly reached out to China for it to assert pressure on the Three Brotherhood Alliance to stop Operation 1027.[281]On January 12, China announced that it had negotiated a ceasefire between the junta and the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The two sides agreed to disengage personnel and pledged not to compromise the safety of Chinese border residents.[282] According to the Brotherhood Alliance, they had agreed not to seize more towns in northern Shan and that the junta had agreed not to shell or strike that area.[283] The following day, the TNLA reported that the junta had broken their ceasefire agreement with airstrikes in various townships in Northern Shan, including Lashio Township and Kyaukme Township.[284]

On 20 January 2024, the Tatamadaw and the Pa-O National Army (PNA) attempted to confiscate the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA)'s weapons.[285] A few days later, firefight broke out in Hopong Township. PNLA retaliated with KNDF and local PDF forces and attacked the town of Hsi Hseng, Shan State eventually capturing it on 26 January 2024.[286] On the same day, the PNLA's political wing formally revoked their participation in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, pledged to help the NUG replace the Junta with a federal system and implored the PNA's political wing to switch sides under the promise that they will not be attacked.[3] On 22 February, clashes broke out east of Hopong after junta/PNA forces attacked PNLA forces. After several hours, junta forces were forced to retreat.[287]

On 10 February 2024, the Tatmadaw announced that all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 will be required to complete up to 2 years of mandatory military service, amid its territorial losses. Those who fail to enlist face imprisonment for up to 5 years during a national emergency.[288] This announcement has been interpreted by some as a sign of increasing desperation in the face of steadily advancing resistance forces[289].

2024 Rakhine offensive[edit]

On 8 January 2024, the Arakan Army continued Operation 1027 and captured the Taung Shey Taung base and its 200 junta soldiers in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State. They then escalated their offence into Paletwa Township, Chin State with the aim of capturing Paletwa, a strategic town for the Indo-Myanmar Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project[290] On 15 January, the Arakan Army seized Paletwa and the entire township, declaring it a "military council-free area."[291] A week later, the Arakan Army captured the town of Pauktaw in Rakhine State concluding a three-month battle.[292]

On 17 January 2024, the Taingen camp on the Falam road to the Indian border was captured, with Chin resistance forces seizing arms and ammunition.[293] On 20 January 2024, after more than 600 junta soldiers and refugees cross the Indo-Myanmar border, the Government of India announced a plan to fence the 1,643 km border.[294]

On 3 February 2024, as the clashes between Arakan Army and Tatmadaw increased in Rakhine, mortar shells and several bullets reportedly landed in Bangladesh territory, which injured some local residents. Repeated bursts of gunfire and explosions were be heard across the Bangladesh–Myanmar border from Ukhia, Cox's Bazar.[295] At least 229 Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) personnel entered Bangladesh through the Tumbru border point seeking refuge from AA, where the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) disarmed them and gave them shelter in Bandarban district.[296] On 5 February 2024, a Bangladeshi woman and a Rohingya man died from a mortar shell that fell on the Ghumdum border in Bandarban, reportedly fired by Myanmar.[21]

The Arakan Army reportedly captured the remaining Tatmadaw bases in Minbya on 6 February, taking full control of the township. The same day, the AA seized the Taung Pyo junta outpost along the border with Bangladesh in Maungdaw Township.[297] The Arakan Army additionally captured Kyauktaw on 7 February, while heavy fighting continued in Mrauk U and Ramree.[298] The Tatmadaw abandoned Myebon to go to Kyaukphyu on 9 February, leaving ammunition behind in their rush and abandoning the southern township of Mrauk-U District.[299] The following day, AA took the town of Mrauk U completing their control over the township. During the battle, three Myanmar Navy landing craft were reportedly sunk.[7][300] In response to the seizure of the three towns, the junta blew up bridges in Kyauktaw Township and the state capital, Sittwe.[301] Five days later, the Arakan Army captured Myebon.[302]

Other fronts[edit]

Tensions rose between the junta and the Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF) as the Karen BGF refused orders from the junta to engage in battle. On 23 January, deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win visited Hpa-An to meet with Karen BGF leader Colonel Saw Chit Thu after the latter refused to come to the capital Naypyidaw and meet the junta.[303] On 14 February, combined forces of the Karenni Army and Karenni Nationalities Defense Force captured the town of Shadaw after almost a month-long battle. This capture led Shadaw Township to be the second Kayah township completely captured by Karenni forces, after Mese.[304]

On 29 January 2024, KNLA and PDF forces shot down a Tatmadaw Eurocopter AS365 as it was landing, killing Brigadier General Aye Min Naung of the 44th Light Infantry Division and four others.[305]

Tatmadaw forces recaptured Kawlin on 10 February 2024 after almost 10 days of fighting. [306] On 22 February, junta forces launched an offensive to recapture the town of Maw Luu, which had been captured by the KIA and ABSDF in December 2023. [307]

New combatants[edit]

On 14 February 2024, a splinter group of the Mon National Liberation Army (who signed a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw), announced that they will no longer negotiate with the junta and will join hands with other revolutionary forces in Mon State.[308]

On 20 February 2024, the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) announced that it and its armed forces will join forces with the anti-junta resistance forces, shifting from its formerly neutral stance towards the military coup.[309] Three days later, SSPP and the allied troops captured a military base between Hopong and Mong Pan[310]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_civil_war_(2021–present) 

jerrym

The brutal Myanmar authoritarian military dictatorship has lost the strategic border town of Myawaddy and its 200,000 inhabitants, as hundreds of soldiers surrender to the rebels. Myawaddy "is also the location for multiple compounds that form the billion dollar online scam factories that have exploded inside Myanmar’s lawless border regions in recent years, many of them staffed by foreign nationals forced to work in conditions akin to modern day slavery. The UN estimates that up to 120,000 people could be held in compounds across Myanmar."

Myanmar rebels fighting the junta say they have seized the last remaining military base in a key border town, dealing the latest significant blow to the country’s military rulers as they struggle to cling to power.

About 200 soldiers abandoned their base in the southeastern town of Myawaddy and have been pushed to the No 2. Friendship Bridge linking Myanmar to Thailand following an attack Wednesday night by Karen resistance fighters, a spokesperson for the Karen National Union told CNN Thursday.

“Officially we (are in) control of the town Myawaddy since last night,” KNU spokesperson Saw Taw Nee said. The loss of the major trading point with Thailand was “a big issue for the military,” he added.

Myawaddy, a strategically important town of 200,000 people, sits across from Thailand’s Mae Sot. The border crossing, which was under the control of the junta, is vital for trade, especially commercial goods and food flowing into Myanmar.

It is also the location for multiple compounds that form the billion dollar online scam factories that have exploded inside Myanmar’s lawless border regions in recent years, many of them staffed by foreign nationals forced to work in conditions akin to modern day slavery. The UN estimates that up to 120,000 people could be held in compounds across Myanmar. ...

The KNU, one of Myanmar’s most powerful ethic armed organizations, said its armed wing captured Battalion 275, the last remaining military base in the town, at around 10 p.m. Wednesday after negotiations for the junta’s troops to lay down their arms broke down.

“We tried to persuade them not to attack us but to surrender, for several hours,” Saw Taw Nee said.

Fighting around Myawaddy has been ongoing for days. Since April 5, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) – the KNU’s military’s wing – and its allies have seized military outposts and bases on the outskirts of Myawaddy. Saw Taw Nee said 670 junta personnel surrendered to the KNLA following these attacks.

Only Battalion 275 was holding out. On Wednesday night, the troops stationed there had expected reinforcements from the military’s Southeast Command to help them. When no reinforcements came, the soldiers abandoned their posts and fled to the border bridge, according to the KNU. ...

Myanmar has been plunged into a devastating civil war after the military seized power in a coup in February 2021, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy and replacing it with a ruling military junta.

The junta has launched increasingly brutal attacks against the people of Myanmar as it struggles to hold on to power. A nationwide armed resistance movement, which includes many of the country’s powerful ethnic rebel armies like the KNU, now poses a legitimate threat to the junta.

There are concerns among the resistance fighters and residents in Myawaddy that the military will launch an air offensive on the town, as it has done in other areas it has lost control of.

A 45-year-old resident in Myawaddy told CNN Thursday that fighter jets had been buzzing overhead and she has sent her eight children across the border to Thailand for their safety....

The fall of Myawaddy to the resistance forces is the latest humiliating defeat for the junta, which has been losing control of towns, bases and territory across the country, as it grapples with troop losses and reports of mass defections.

Last month, ethnic rebels in northern Kachin state seized a key trading town on the Myanmar-China border, along with dozens of outposts and bases, according to local media. In western Rakhine state, the Arakan Army has recently seized major towns and is gaining significant ground against junta forces.

Analysts say the fall of Myawaddy to the resistance is a turning point because it underlines the junta’s inability to reverse its defeats.

“Step by step it’s just watching these losses and not being able to do anything in response,” said independent Myanmar researcher Kim Jolliffe. “That’s why it further confirms the junta is going to fall because it’s just not at any point displayed the ability to strategically reverse the situation and regain initiative.”

https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/11/asia/myanmar-myawaddy-knu-military-junta-....

 

jerrym

According to Human Rights Watch, as the brutal Myanmar government faces more and more defeats it is now drafting Moslem Rohingya men into the army. This is the same group  that only a few years ago the government was committing genocide  against, burning their communities or causing many to flee to Bangladesh. "The junta is using a conscription law that only applies to Myanmar citizens, although the Rohingya have long been denied citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law.... The military has been sending Rohingya to abusive training for two weeks, then deploying them. ... Officials have also threatened to beat Rohingya to death if they refuse to join or to punish their families if they fled." With little training they are basically being used as cannon fodder as the war increasingly goes bad for the military and government. 

The Myanmar military has abducted and forcibly recruited more than 1,000 Rohingya Muslim men and boys from across Rakhine State since February 2024, Human Rights Watch said today. The junta is using a conscription law that only applies to Myanmar citizens, although the Rohingya have long been denied citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law.

Rohingya described being picked up in nighttime raids, coerced with false promises of citizenship, and threatened with arrest, abduction, and beatings. The military has been sending Rohingya to abusive training for two weeks, then deploying them. Many have been sent to the front lines in the surging fighting between the junta and the Arakan Army armed group, which broke out in Rakhine State in November 2023, and a number have been killed and injured.

“It’s appalling to see Myanmar’s military, which has committed atrocities against the Rohingya for decades while denying them citizenship, now forcing them to fight on its behalf,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The junta should immediately end this forced recruitment and permit Rohingya unlawfully conscripted to return home.”

Human Rights Watch documented 11 cases of forced recruitment, drawing on interviews with 25 Rohingya from Sittwe, Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Pauktaw, and Kyauktaw townships in Rakhine State and in Bangladesh.

On February 10, the military activated the 2010 People’s Military Service Law, enabling the conscription of men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27 for up to five years during the current state of emergency. The announcement followed months of increased fighting with ethnic armed groups and resistance forces.

n late February, the military abducted over 150 Rohingya in raids on villages in Buthidaung township, according to people interviewed, Rohingya activists, and media reports. A 22-year-old Rohingya man said that light infantry battalion soldiers abducted him and 30 other young men and boys at gunpoint at about 11 p.m. on February 25 in Buthidaung town.

“The youngest boy taken away with us was 15 years old,” he said. “There were three recruits under 18 among us. After we were apprehended and taken to the military battalion, we saw the list of Rohingya who were going to be recruited. All the Rohingya youths in the region were included.”

Further raids took place in Maungdaw township in March. A 24-year-old Rohingya man who was abducted with about two dozen others from Ka Nyin Tan village said the officers told them, “Protecting Maungdaw is upon you.”

An estimated 630,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State under a system of apartheid and persecution, including about 150,000 held in open-air detention camps. Since the February 2021 military coup, the junta has imposed severe movement restrictions and aid blockages on the Rohingya, increasing their vulnerability to forced recruitment.

Rohingya camp management committee members said that junta authorities have been tallying “eligible” Rohingya or compelling the committees to make lists. Two members said when they tried to refuse, junta authorities further restricted movement in the camps and threatened mass arrests and ration cuts. “We had no other option,” one committee member said.

At meetings in camps in Sittwe and Kyaukpyu, junta officials promised to issue all forced recruits pink citizenship cards, reserved for “full” citizens. “In the meetings, officers picked up their citizenship cards and told people, ‘We will give you this type of ID card if you join the military service,’” a camp management committee member in Thet Kae Pyin camp said. “People believed them.” Authorities also promised 4,800 kyat (US$2.30) a day and two sacks of rice.

About 300 Rohingya from the Sittwe camps were sent to two weeks of military training in late February. Upon completion, the military gave the forced recruits 50,000 kyats ($24) but no citizenship cards. “When the junta broke their promise to issue citizenship cards to the first 300 Rohingya recruits, people stopped believing them and started avoiding the recruitment campaigns,” a camp management committee member said. Rohingya in the Sittwe camps said that for the second round of forced recruitment, the few hundred Rohingya were taken at gunpoint in raids.

Officials have also threatened to beat Rohingya to death if they refuse to join or to punish their families if they fled.

Many young Rohingya men have tried to escape Rakhine State or gone into hiding in the jungle to escape forced recruitment. The authorities rounded up and beat about 40 Rohingya from Kyauk Ta Lone camp when their family members ran away, according to Radio Free Asia. ...

The forcible recruitment campaign has already resulted in casualties. After their training, 100 Rohingya from the Sittwe camps were sent to fight on the front lines in Rathedaung. Five were killed in fighting and 10 were seriously injured, one of whom later died, according to family members and camp leaders. The military authorities promised the families compensation of a million kyat ($476) and two sacks of rice. The five bodies have not been returned.

While 43 forced recruits later returned to the camps, there has been no news from the remainder. “We still don’t know their whereabouts,” a camp leader said. “We don’t know if they’re still alive.”

https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/09/myanmar-military-forcibly-recruiting....

jerrym

The Council on Foreign Relations reports that the Myanmar military regime may well be facing defeat in its war against a diverse range of rebels.The Thai PM admits that the military junta's forces are weakening. 

Already under siege on multiple fronts, facing defections and, reportedly, turmoil in some of the senior ranks of the armed forces, the Myanmar military, which has dominated the country, is now seeing its losses snowball faster and faster—with a possible endgame looming quicker than many imagined.

The opposition forces, comprised of a blend of longstanding ethnic armies that have strengthened their bonds and grown more audacious in confronting the weakening Myanmar military, alongside groups primarily consisting of ethnic Burmans who abandoned nonviolent resistance shortly after the coup, have achieved numerous significant victories in recent weeks. The opposition recently captured the Myanmar town of Myawaddy, right on the border with Thailand, just across a narrow river from the Thai town of Mae Sot, where many aid groups are already located. This gain facilitates a potential channel for aid (and possibly weapons) to be moved directly into opposition territory. (I’ve spent a good deal of time in Mae Sot, and as a border town, it is one of the most interesting places in Southeast Asia, with a Wild West feeling and always full of spies from various countries.) Primarily ethnic Karen rebels have seized the critical town and also claim that hundreds of Myanmar troops have surrendered—hardly an implausible claim, given that the number of surrenders and defections has been increasing in recent months.

The town would allow humanitarian groups and foreign governments to move nonlethal assistance into opposition-held territory much more efficiently via a direct link with Thailand, presuming the Thai government agrees—which is not guaranteed, but probably likely. More lethal types of aid could also be moved across at the same point. However, the United States has shied away from providing even items that could border on lethal aid, like satellite communications tools, to the frustration of some in Congress who have worked for years trying to support the opposition. Nevertheless, the opposition could now source weapons more easily across the border through various arms brokers—the Thai military can be a sieve, for instance, when holding light weapons.  

Thailand’s prime minister has publicly said that the junta is weakening, a startling admission for a Thai leader when Thailand for decades has primarily tried to keep its hands off anything the Myanmar military did. He also denied the junta’s request to land aircraft over the border in Thailand while Myawaddy was being evacuated, saying that Thailand would allow some cargo to be offloaded in Thailand but not fleeing Myanmar army soldiers.

The opposition forces have also enjoyed a string of other recent triumphs, tightening the noose on the ruling junta. Since last October, a group of opposition forces, working together, have battered the military in northern Shan State, delivering a series of significant blows to the army, grabbing territory and forcing surrenders and defections. The Shan State offensive stretched the military and made it vulnerable in other parts of the country, where other opposition groups attacked—in places like Myawaddy or in western Myanmar, where the military faces a fairly fierce fighting force, the Arakan Army. The Arakan Army has already captured several major Myanmar junta battalions and claims that it has taken over several important Myanmar army bases and training schools in western Myanmar. The opposition even launched a bold drone strike, dropping explosives on the military’s supposedly fortress capital, Naypyidaw, which it carved out of the woods in the middle of nowhere in central Myanmar. It remains unclear what, if anything, the drones hit, but simply the fact that Naypyidaw was ambushed shows how the military’s intelligence—like all its components—is deteriorating.

With all these surrenders in various parts of the country, the opposition often depletes the army’s personnel and captures a wide range of weapons. The junta’s demise may be coming soon.

https://www.cfr.org/blog/myanmars-military-facing-defeat-amid-civil-war